Quo vadis Europa?

This question was asked by Joschka Fischer, German Foreign Minister between 1998 and 2005, in a famous speech at the Humboldt University in Berlin, on 12 May 2000. It is entitled "From Confederacy to Federation - Thoughts on the finality of European integration" and you can find it in this document, page 19 (PDF).

The speech is illuminating and should be on the reading list of any student of the current Euro crisis. Take a look, for instance, on this prophetic passage (my emphasis):

In Maastricht, one of the three essential sovereign rights of the modern nation-state—currency, internal security and external security—was, for the first time, transferred to the sole responsibility of a European institution. The introduction of the euro was not only the crowning-point of economic integration, it was also a profoundly political act, because a currency is not just another economic factor but also symbolises the power of the sovereign who guarantees it. A tension has emerged between the communitarisation of economy and currency on the one hand, and the lack of political and democratic structures on the other, a tension which might lead to crises within the EU if we do not take productive steps to make good the short fall in political integration and democracy, thus completing the process of integration.

He was discussing the process of reform upon which the EU embarked as a response to the collapse of the Soviet Union. He then states that Europe was organizing two major projects in parallel: (i) enlargement as quickly as possible (for fear of the orphan republics of the Soviet Union) and (ii) Europe's capacity to act (i.e., the decision making processes). Concerning the drive to enlarge the EU, the German minister had this too say:

Enlargement is a supreme national interest, especially for Germany. It will be possible to lastingly overcome the risks and temptations objectively inherent in Germany’s dimensions and central situation through the enlargement and simultaneous deepening of the EU.

Which are these "temptations"? The drive towards nationalism and militarization, which has always been Germany's natural response to being geographically encircled by potentially hostile nations. But fast enlargement had other benefits:

Moreover, enlargement—consider the EU’s enlargement to the south—is a pan-European programme for growth. Enlargement will bring tremendous benefits for German companies and for employment. Germany must, therefore, continue its advocacy of rapid eastern enlargement.

On the other hand, enlargement without reform of the decision making machinery was dangerous:

 The danger will then be that enlargement to include twenty seven or thirty members will hopelessly overload the EU’s ability to absorb, with its old institutions and mechanisms, even with increased use of majority decisions, and that it could lead to severe crises.

In the second half of his speech, Fischer defends his conception of the final form European integration. I will comment on this section in a future post. Right now, I would like to paste here another quote:

This new principle of the European system of states, which could almost be called revolutionary, emanated from France and her two great statesmen Robert Schuman and Jean Monnet. Every stage of its gradual realisation, from the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community to the creation of the single market and the introduction of the single currency, depended essentially on the alliance of Franco-German interests.

I read in this an admission that the survival of the eurozone and, perhaps, of the EU itself rest on Germany and France having aligned interests. If this is true, what then does the following graph say to us?