Showing posts with label speech. Show all posts
Showing posts with label speech. Show all posts

Saturday, November 19, 2011

"Where is the implementation?"

A couple of weeks ago I wrote a post about the first press conference of Mr. Mario Draghi as president of the ECB and I entitled it "A tranquil messenger of continuity". The word "continuity" reappeared yesterday in the title of Mr. Draghi's introductory remarks at the 21st Frankfurt European Banking Congress.

In his remarks, he did not deviate a millimeter from his initial message. The ECB is aware of the current stress in the funding markets, in essence he says, but it is doing what it legally can. Draghi will not risk losing the credibility of the ECB by embarking on stealth fiscal policy. Read below the key passage, implicitly directed to those who demand from the ECB a full scale monetization of the sovereign debt of Italy and Spain:
Let me use this occasion to dwell a bit further on monetary policy in the current environment. Three principles are of the essence: continuity, consistency and credibility.

Continuity first and foremost refers to our primary objective of maintaining price stability over the medium term.

Consistency means to act in line with our primary objective and with our strategy both in time and over time.

Credibility implies that our monetary policy is successful in anchoring inflation expectations over the medium and longer term. This is the major contribution we can make in support of sustainable growth, employment creation and financial stability. And we are making this contribution in full independence.
 
Gaining credibility is a long and laborious process. Maintaining it is a permanent challenge. But losing credibility can happen quickly – and history shows that regaining it has huge economic and social costs.

These three principles – continuity, consistency and credibility – are at the root of the Governing Council’s outstanding record during the past 13 years in terms of price stability and anchoring inflation expectations. 
What is most relevant to the current crisis: "anchoring inflations expectations is the major contribution the ECB can make in support of financial stability." Those who expect and demand more, will be disapointed.

You can almost sense a heroic stance in his thinking. It is a virtue to resist the calls for unlimited and aggressive financing of European governments, because he is defending a hard-won asset: the credibility of the Central Bank. For this man, it will be a deep personal failure to give in in this issue. My guess is that he would step down first from the presidency. From his point of view, he is doing his part while others aren't:
We are more than one and a half years after the summit that launched the EFSF as part of a financial support package amounting to 750 billion euros or one trillion dollars; we are four months after the summit that decided to make the full EFSF guarantee volume available; and we are four weeks after the summit that agreed on leveraging of the resources by a factor of up to four or five and that declared the EFSF would be fully operational and that all its tools will be used in an effective way to ensure financial stability in the euro area. Where is the implementation of these long-standing decisions?
UPDATE: Krugman has read the same speech and, predictably, is furious. He cannot understand why the ECB refuses itself from the role of lender of last resort in face of a self-fulfilling crisis of confidence in the Eurosystem. I believe this criticism would be fair if directed to a national central bank. The ECB, on the other hand, is only a piece in game between different nation-states.

Thursday, November 10, 2011

Quo vadis Europa?

This question was asked by Joschka Fischer, German Foreign Minister between 1998 and 2005, in a famous speech at the Humboldt University in Berlin, on 12 May 2000. It is entitled "From Confederacy to Federation - Thoughts on the finality of European integration" and you can find it in this document, page 19 (PDF).

The speech is illuminating and should be on the reading list of any student of the current Euro crisis. Take a look, for instance, on this prophetic passage (my emphasis):
In Maastricht, one of the three essential sovereign rights of the modern nation-state—currency, internal security and external security—was, for the first time, transferred to the sole responsibility of a European institution. The introduction of the euro was not only the crowning-point of economic integration, it was also a profoundly political act, because a currency is not just another economic factor but also symbolises the power of the sovereign who guarantees it. A tension has emerged between the communitarisation of economy and currency on the one hand, and the lack of political and democratic structures on the other, a tension which might lead to crises within the EU if we do not take productive steps to make good the short fall in political integration and democracy, thus completing the process of integration.
He was discussing the process of reform upon which the EU embarked as a response to the collapse of the Soviet Union. He then states that Europe was organizing two major projects in parallel: (i) enlargement as quickly as possible (for fear of the orphan republics of the Soviet Union) and (ii) Europe's capacity to act (i.e., the decision making processes). Concerning the drive to enlarge the EU, the German minister had this too say:
Enlargement is a supreme national interest, especially for Germany. It will be possible to lastingly overcome the risks and temptations objectively inherent in Germany’s dimensions and central situation through the enlargement and simultaneous deepening of the EU.
Which are these "temptations"? The drive towards nationalism and militarization, which has always been Germany's natural response to being geographically encircled by potentially hostile nations. But fast enlargement had other benefits:
Moreover, enlargement—consider the EU’s enlargement to the south—is a pan-European programme for growth. Enlargement will bring tremendous benefits for German companies and for employment. Germany must, therefore, continue its advocacy of rapid eastern enlargement.
On the other hand, enlargement without reform of the decision making machinery was dangerous:
 The danger will then be that enlargement to include twenty seven or thirty members will hopelessly overload the EU’s ability to absorb, with its old institutions and mechanisms, even with increased use of majority decisions, and that it could lead to severe crises.
In the second half of his speech, Fischer defends his conception of the final form European integration. I will comment on this section in a future post. Right now, I would like to paste here another quote:
This new principle of the European system of states, which could almost be called revolutionary, emanated from France and her two great statesmen Robert Schuman and Jean Monnet. Every stage of its gradual realisation, from the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community to the creation of the single market and the introduction of the single currency, depended essentially on the alliance of Franco-German interests.
I read in this an admission that the survival of the eurozone and, perhaps, of the EU itself rest on Germany and France having aligned interests. If this is true, what then does the following graph say to us?